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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-2a-3(2)((j), in that this matter was transferred from the Utah 
Supreme Court, as provided by Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-2-2(4). The Utah Supreme Court 
has appellate jurisdiction of the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) as the 
case involves an appeal from a final order and judgment of a court of record over which 
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY TREAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Standard of Review 
When a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is presented, the decision to 
consider matters outside the pleadings initially lies in the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
Appellate courts will accordingly review for abuse-of-discretion. 
ISSUE II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
DEFENDANT-DETERMINING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO BE BARRED BY 
LACK OF PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND RES JUDICATA. 
Standard of Review 
A party's entitlement to summary judgment involves only questions of law. 
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Accordingly, the appellate court reviews for legal correctness applying the correction-
of-error standard, giving the trial court no particular deference. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow 
Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 
(Utah App. 199%); Mumfordv. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 1043 
(Utah App. 1993). See also Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996); Smith v. 
Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990). 
ISSUE III 
SHOULD THIS COURT GRANT DAMAGES TO APPELLEE UNDER RULE 
33, U.R.A.P. FOR THE APPELLANT'S TAKING OF A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Standard of Review 
Whether attorney fees or other damages should be awarded for the taking of a 
frivolous appeal is within the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals under Rule 33, 
U.R.A.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October of 1975, Reed L. Peterson (deceased father of defendant Curtis 
Peterson) and other family members, entered into a written contract with Dale and 
Kathleen F. Tubbs, for the sale of the Peterson family farm located at Oneida County, 
Idaho. On February 24,1983, the Tubbs assigned their rights under the agreement to 
Elwood (brother of plaintiff, F. Stanley Nielsen) and Lynn Nielsen, husband and wife. In 
February of 1986, the Nielsens commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, and in January of 1988, converted 
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said bankruptcy proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation. During the pendency of the 
bankruptcy, the Petersens and Nielsens entered into an agreement August 6,1986 for the 
lease-option purchase of the farm property, subject to approval of the agreement by the 
bankruptcy court. In the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, the debtors' interest in the 
Idaho real property was then abandoned by the trustee, as the amount owing on the 
contract exceeded the property value. The abandonment was approved by the 
Bankruptcy Court. (Record at 32 and 33). 
Defendant, Curtis Petersen, the only person served with plaintiffs original 
complaint and therefore made a party defendant to this action, never signed the August 6, 
1986 agreement. (Record at 9). Robert Petersen was later served with plaintiffs amended 
complaint, but the court never granted leave for the filing of the amended complaint, nor 
was court permission to amend ever sought by plaintiff. 
Subsequent to the Utah bankruptcy proceedings, the Petersens commenced suit in 
December of 1988, in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Oneida County, State of 
Idaho, seeking to quiet title to the Idaho real property, in the matter of Reed L. Petersen 
et. al., vs. Elwood L. Nielsen et. al, Case No. CV-88-7-874. On August 21,1991, the 
Idaho District Court entered its Memorandum Decision & Order adjudging the August 6, 
1986 agreement to be void and unenforceable. (Record at 32). Later, pursuant to a 
summary judgment following an amendment of Petersens' complaint, on April 26,1993, 
the Idaho District Court entered a further Decree Foreclosing Mortgage and Ordering 
Sale, thereby extinguishing any remaining interest of the Nielsens in the real property. 
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(Record at 39). Again on November 9, 1994, the Idaho District Court entered its Order 
Re: Contempt voiding a "Notice of Claim" that Nielsen had recorded against the real 
property claiming the August 6, 1986 agreement to be "in full force and effect." (Record 
at 44). The court further adjudged the recording of the notice to be a "contemptible 
action" on the part of the Nielsens and awarded appropriate attorney fees. On June 14, 
1996, the Idaho District Court entered its final Order Quieting Title to the real property in 
favor of the Petersens and against the Nielsens (Record at 48). The Nielsens thereafter 
sought relief in the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, and on November 7,1996, the 
Idaho Supreme Court granted Petersens' motion to dismiss the appeal (Record at 52). 
Following this extensive litigation, on October 9,1996, Elwood and Lynn Nielsen 
assigned their interests, if any, in the lease-option agreement to F. Stanley Nielsen 
(plaintiff herein), who then sought to further press the judicially voided claims of his 
brother. As a result, on August 6,1999, Reed L. Petersen Investment Company and other 
family members brought suit claiming slander of title against Elwood L. Nielsen and F. 
Stanley Nielsen in the Oneida County District Court, State of Idaho, Case No. CV-97-
566. In that case, Nielsens filed their counterclaim seeking relief for breach of the 
previously voided August 6,1986 (lease-option) agreement. On April 22,1999, the Idaho 
District Court, on cross motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, 
entered its Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing the Petersens' slander of title 
claim along with the renewed contract claim of the Nielsens. (Record at 134). On May 
24,1999, the Idaho District Court entered its Minute Entry and Order denying various 
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motions to reconsider. (Record at 159). The Idaho court thereafter entered its Final 
Judgment of July 16,1999 fully dismissing Petersens' slander of title suit and Nielsens' 
breach of contract counterclaim. On September 11, 1999, the Idaho trial court filed its 
Memorandum Decision & Order RE: Costs and Fees awarding F. Stanley Nielsen 
attorney fees and costs of $3,536.25 for his defense of the slander of title claim. 
Petersens were similarly awarded attorney fees and costs of $1,345.50 for their successful 
defense of the renewed contract counterclaim. Attorney fees and costs were denied to 
Elwood and Lynn Nielsen. 
Apparently displeased with the judgments of the Idaho trial and appellate courts, 
and the progress of the Idaho litigation, F. Stanley Nielsen, on January 19,1999, and prior 
to the decisions of the Oneida County District Court on the second round of litigation, 
brought his complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, Utah, 
serving only defendant Curtis Petersen, who had never signed the August 6,1998 
agreement, and naming other family members. (Record at 1). In this Utah action, F. 
Stanley Nielsen, for the third time, seeks relief for breach of the August 6,1986 contract 
that Curtis Petersen never signed and also damages in tort for malicious prosecution, 
namely, the bringing of the Idaho slander of title suit. On February 24,1999, and again 
on October 15,1999, F. Stanley Nielsen filed his Amended Complaint, later serving 
defendant Robert Petersen, but never sought or received leave of court for the 
amendment. 
In response to plaintiffs complaint, defendant Curtis Petersen filed his motion to 
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dismiss, or in the alternative, for more definite statement and for sanctions, March 2, 
1999. Mr. Nielsen then filed his motion for summary judgment seeking judgment for 
$130,492.35, well in excess of the prayer of his complaint ($24,550.00), for attorney fees 
in obtaining the dismissal of the Idaho slander of title action. In opposition to the 
summary judgment request, Curtis Petersen filed affidavits of Philip Patterson, a local 
Utah attorney, and Randall Kline, an Idaho legal practitioner. Both indicated that such a 
fee would be excessive and unreasonable for a pretrial motion. (Record at 105 and 165). 
As requested by both parties, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and 
defendant Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss and for other relief were all argued to the 
District Court October 14,1999. After taking the matters under advisement, the trial court, 
the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presiding, entered its Ruling January 31, 2000 and its 
Order Granting Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff February 25,2000. From this final 
order plaintiff appeals. 
STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 25-5-3: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, 
of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent there unto authorized in writing. 
Rules 33(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal Except in a first appeal of right in 
a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award damages, which 
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable 
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attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages 
be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed 
for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as 
to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that 
will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceedings 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Treating defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment 
when both parties presented matters outside of the pleadings, which matters 
were not objected to or excluded by the court, was within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. This discretion should not be disturbed. 
2. The trial court was legally correct in granting summary judgment when the 
record clearly showed that defendant had not signed the land lease-option contract 
Moreover, the claims asserted by the plaintiff were clearly barred by the 
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel having been fully litigated 
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to a conclusion in the courts of Idaho. 
3. Any irregularities in the pleadings filed by either party could not have 
affected the substantial rights of the parties or the decision reached by the court 
and therefore must be disregarded as harmless error. 
4. Plaintiff has taken this appeal frivolously as his position is not warranted 
under existing law, and plaintiff has not even attempted to advance a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. As the 
appeal was taken for an improper purpose, the court should grant proper damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS SOUND DISCRETION IN 
TREATING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS A MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In response to the complaint brought by F. Stanley Nielsen, defendant Curtis 
Petersen filed his motion to dismiss and for alternative relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
U.R.C.P., along with supporting memorandum and exhibits. Nielsen, in turn, responded 
with the filing of his own motion for summary judgment with memorandum and 
supporting affidavit of plaintiff. Both parties, through counsel, appeared and argued 
all motions pending before the court. As allowed and anticipated by the provisions of 
Rule 12(b), both sides presented and argued "matters outside the pleading," which were 
considered and not excluded by the court under the provisions of the rule. Such matters 
outside of the pleadings included the written decisions of the Idaho trial and appellate 
courts. Both sides, without objection, detailed and argued the long and complicated 
relationship of the parties, their predecessors in interest, along with the prior and ongoing 
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Idaho litigation. At no time during the proceedings did the court, on its own initiative 
try to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment by requesting 
additional evidence. Such additional evidence was furnished unsolicited by the parties. 
Even after oral argument, Nielsen submitted an additional affidavit and other 
memorandum in support of his position. Under such circumstances, it was suitable, 
proper, and well within the sound discretion of the trial judge to treat defendant's 
dismissal motion as one for summary judgment and to enter judgment accordingly. See 
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. Of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977); Hill ex rel 
Fogel v. Grand Cent Inc., All P.2d 150 (Utah 1970). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS BARRED BY LACK OF CONTRACT 
PRIVITY AND RES JUDICATA 
Contractual Privity 
F. Stanley Nielsen brings this action, as assignee of his brother, seeking damages 
under the lease-option agreement of August 6,1986. A review of the contract will 
demonstrate that the only defendant in the action, Curtis Petersen, never signed and is 
therefore not a party to the agreement. Neither is Robert Petersen (served with amended 
complaint) a signatory. As a lease or purchase of real property is contemplated, Utah's 
Statute of Frauds would render the contract void as to any person not a signatory thereto. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, 
of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 
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the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. Utah Code Ann., Section 25-5-3. 
While suggesting that Curtis Petersen was the personal representative or somehow 
a successor in interest to his late father, Nielsen never produced any admissible evidence 
to support such a claim or even to put such a fact in issue. 
Res Judicata 
Plaintiffs brother and assignor, Elwood Nielsen, and his wife, were parties to the 
first Idaho action brought by the Petersen family to quiet title against Nielsens to the 
same real property described in the lease-option agreement. The Nielsens, in turn, 
defended this suit claiming the continuing right to exercise the purchase option. The 
Idaho District Court found the agreement to be void and unenforceable. Later, the court 
entered its decree foreclosing any remaining interest Nielsens could have had in the 
property. The Nielsens took an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and their appeal was 
dismissed. Later, in the second Idaho action, Elwood Nielsen, and his brother F. Stanley 
Nielsen, brought their counterclaim again claiming breach of the lease-purchase 
agreement. In case there was any confusion from the judgment of the first Idaho 
court, the second Idaho District Court was very clear in dismissing the Nielsen claims. 
Both Elwood and F. Stanley Nielsen have had more than ample opportunity to bring 
their grievances to the judiciary. They are not entitled, however, to litigate the same 
issues and the same claims until they find a friendly judicial ear. The doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel are intended to bring finality to judicial determinations. 
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This court had occasion to review the nature and extent of both doctrines in the 
recent case of Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 1994). In 
this case, the court outlined the requirements of res judicata as follows: 
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties 
or their privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes the 
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that 
were in fact litigated in the prior action. Id. at 667 (quoting Schner vs. State 
ex rel UDOT, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1983) and Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). 
Added to the foregoing, is the requirement that 'the first suit must have resulted 
in a final judgment on the merits." Madsen vs. Borthick,1r69 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); 
InreJJ.T., 877P.2d 161,163 (Utah App. 1994). 
In the instant case, the same cause of action (breach of lease-option agreement) 
was twice presented to the Idaho District Court, by the same parties or their privies. 
Twice the claim was rejected. F. Stanley Nielsen was a party to the second Idaho suit 
and comes here as assignee of Elwood and Lynn Nielsen. In both Idaho lawsuits, final 
judgments were entered. Res Judicata therefore precludes the continued litigation of the 
contract claim and required the Weber County District Court to grant summary judgment 
against F. Stanley Nielsen. 
Collateral Estoppel 
Somewhat similar to the doctrine of res judicata is the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues 
that have once been litigated even though the claims for relief may be 
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different. Estate of Covington, at 667, citing with approval, Penrod v. 
Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). 
For collateral estoppel to apply, three requirements must be met: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, 
the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the 
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits. Am. Estate Mgt. v. Intern. Inv. & Dev., 986 P.2d 765, 766 
(Utah App. 1999), citing with approval Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 
247 (Utah 1988); Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
From the foregoing, it seems clear that Nielsen's contract claim is not only barred 
by res judicata, but as all of the foregoing requirements are met by the Idaho litigation, 
collateral estoppel would bar it as well. 
Further, Nielsen's second cause of action in tort for malicious prosecution would 
be precluded under the collateral estoppel doctrine. This claim, and the issues raised 
therein, not only could and should have been raised in the second Idaho case, but to a 
large extent were raised and adjudicated. 
As noted by this court in American Estate, 986 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1999), the 
Utah Supreme Court has previously defined a "claim" or "cause of action" as: 
"the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in 
the courts." A claim is the "situation or state of facts which entitled a party to 
sustain an action and gives him the right to seek judicial interference in his 
behalf." A claim petitions the court to award a remedy for injury suffered 
by the plaintiff. Id. at 767, citing Swainston vs. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988). 
The damage plaintiff complains of in his malicious prosecution claim herein 
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is the attorney fees incurred in defending and obtaining judgment on the pleadings in 
the second Idaho lawsuit. Indeed, this is the basis of his summary judgment claim of 
$130,492.35 made to and denied by the court below. This same attorney's fee issue 
was raised by plaintiff in the second Idaho court in his motion for attorney fees and 
costs, and as the prevailing party on that issue, the Idaho court awarded him proper fees 
of $3,36.25. As he failed to prevail on the contract issue, the court also awarded 
Petersens $1,345.50 against him, a net win for Nielsen of about $2,000.00. 
Accordingly, as the principal issues relating to Nielsen's present tort claim 
were raised and decided in prior foreign litigation, he is now collaterally estoppel to 
assert them in a new jurisdiction. The Utah District Court properly disposed of this claim 
by granting summary judgment. 
POINT III 
ANY IRREGULARITIES IN THE PLEADINGS MUST BE DISREGARDED 
AS HARMLESS ERROR 
As noted by the trial court in its Ruling of January 31,2000, and as a review of 
the record will demonstrate, the parties "filed may other motions and pleadings with the 
court, many of which contravene established rules of procedure." Such a review will 
similarly show that while such irregularities may be present, they in no way impacted 
the substantial rights of the parties or the ultimate ruling of the court. Given the obvious 
fact that Curtis Petersen, the only person plaintiff choose to serve in the case, did not 
even sign the contract in question, along with the extended history of the Idaho litigation, 
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the choice for the court was clear. Under such circumstances, Rule 61, U.R.C.P., 
mandates that the court "must disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Any defects complained of by plaintiff are 
harmless error. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS NOT WARRANTED BY EXISTING LAW, AND 
IS NOT BASED ON A GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT TO EXTEND, MODIFY, 
OR REVERSE EXISTING LAW. 
In the case before the court, plaintiff commenced suit for breach of contract in the 
District Court of Weber County on a claim he knew to be previously rejected by the 
Idaho courts, and indeed still pending in those courts. To compound his error, he joined 
as the only party defendant in this matter, a person who never even signed the contract 
that he seeks to enforce. Plaintiff made no good faith argument in the court below as to 
why the long honored and well know doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, 
under Utah or Idaho law, should be modified or reversed. Again, he advances no such 
argument to this court. 
Under these circumstances, Rule 33, U.R.A.P., dictates that the taking of such an 
appeal is taken for an "an improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal." 
Defendant accordingly respectfully request that the court consider the award of 
appropriate damages under Rule 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellee requests that the court affirm the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment against appellant and in favor or appellee. 
Respectfully submitted this "!> day of DecemhefT2000. 
&*gO 
JOWLTON 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Certify mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following this 
2-* day of December, 2000, postage prepaid: 
Robert L. Froerer 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Daniel L. Hawkley 
PO Box 44106 
Boise, Idaho 857 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 6,1986 
EXHIBIT 1 
l . ^ . " M . r » l 
AGREEMENT 
This agreement entered into this JdX day of August, 1986 by and 
between Reed L. Petersen and Ethel Petersen, husband and wife, Norman 
L. Petersen ana . ' V ^ ' Petersen, husband and wire, !_3vern H. Petersen and 
tne Estate of Gecrg 2 :i -etersen, Percy E. Petersen and Inez 6. Petersen, 
nusband anc wife [hereinafter r$!zrrt to 3S the "Petersens"]. and Elwocd 
L Nielsen and Lynn Nielsen, nusfcand and wife, [hereinafter refered to as 
"Nielsen's"], 3na Lynwood Developement Coro., A Utah Corporation. 
WITNESSETH; 
WHEREAS, uricer the date or October i, 1975, the PETERSEN'S, as 
sellers, entered into 3 contract with Dale F. Tubbs and Kathleen F. Tubbs, 
buyers, cf Malad, Idaho, whicn contract Is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A*, 
and incorporated herein by reference, 'wnereln and whereby the seller's 
agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, 
conditions and orovis'ons therein setferin, all that certlan land, with the 
buildings 2nd improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying and being In 
the County of Oneida, State of Idaho, and more particularly described as 
in said agreement au&cftea hereto as EXHIBIT "A" in writing and legally 
described in writing therein, reference is made hereby to the LAND, 
BUILDUPS, TERMS, CONDITIONS AND PROVISIONS thereof; and 
WHEREAS, said sellers and buyers, established an ESCROW with 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, OGDEN, UTAH, In connection with said 
contract, [Hereinafter refered to as the "ESCROW"], arid 
WHEREAS, the said agreement was ASSIGNED to the NIELSEN'S by one 
certain 'ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT', dated the 24th'day of February 1983, 
by tr.e TUBBS, as ASSIGNORS, and the PETERSEN'S as ORIGINAL SELLERS 
and VALLEY 3ANK as ASSIGNEE, for and in behalf of ELWOOD L. NIELSEN 
AND LYNN NIELSEN ana as TRUSTEE In their behalf. A copy of said 
"ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT" is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "B" and also 
made a part hereof by reference and according to the terms contained 
therein, and 
Ey^fSnT P 
•J i;;:ur>i 
WHEREAS, Eccrcmi: and concitio.ns beyond the confol of the 
NIELSEN'S causae :hwr to seek shelter u-der "CHAPTER ! 1 CF THE UNITED 
STATES EANKRL'PTC'' CODE". AND in order tc avcid further ciS*ccmfort and 
pf-ooiems 'or the PETERSEN'S End also in the uteres: of tne ESTATE c' 
the NIELSEN'S, s.nce the NIELSEN'S nave paid :o the TUEBS ani the 
PETERSEN'S thru a Trust for that purpose, very large sums of money, 
which present ECONOMIC CONOiTIONS preclude them from securing thru 
sale or other/;ise, for the oenef it of,'THE ESTATE". 
IT :S HERE5V AGREED * 5 FOLLOWS: 
The NIELSEN'S shall request from the BANKRUPTCY COURT, the 
reis25e cf the oroserty scld by the PETERSEN'S to TUBBS, (the interest 
of TU5S5, having Been satlslflefl), In the CONTRACT, refered to Herein as 
EXHIBIT "A* anc also the release cf the ASSIGNMENT Of CONTRACT, 
referee to herein as EXHIBIT "3", STRICTLY UPON THE FOLLOWIN3 TERMS 
AND CCNOITICNS with no varience therefrom without agreement jp 
writing between the parties: 
'. The PETERSEN'S shall bid the Farm land into the 1586 Farm Program 
known as the 'CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM" and shall recieve the 
payments therefrom and pay ali Taxes and Assessments of every Kind and 
nature on the property refered to in EXHIBIT "A* fcr the 10 year period of 
the Conservation Reserve Contract. They shall further agree to maintain 
the property free one clear of any and all encumbrance during said 10 
year period. 
2. PETERSEN5 hereby lease to the NIELSENS the house, outbuildings, 
lane upon wnicn cney are located and that land adjacent thereto and used 
for the enjoyment thereof. In addition, PETERSEN'S .ALSO HEREBY LEASE 
TC NIELSEN'S any and all land net under contract to the C0NSERVAT1CN 
RESERVE PROGRAM tc use only for purposes not In conflict with the rules 
and regulations cf said program. This lease shall run concurrent with trie 
CONSERVATION RESERVE CONTRACT entered Into by the PETERSEN'S for a 
period of 10 years and untlll time allowed for notice of Intent to 
exercise option has expired, 180 days following the termination of the 
CR? contract. The NIELSEN'S agree to maintain the buildings and fences 
during the loss's period and to cause Insurance to De placed upon the 
house. The Nielsen's further agree not to encUTnSef me 1655*3 pre t t ies ' 
during said lease period. 
3 iz:uni 
3. The PETERSEN'S , having rec:eved tne CONSERVATION RESERVE 
PAYMENTS FOR THE iO years herecy grant, bargain, and s'el! to, THE 
ESTATE", ci tne NIF_5£N"S, an OPTION to pircnase all of the lane, 
buildings, attachments anc appurtances discribed in EXHIBIT "A" for the 
s u n or $300,000.00 , wnich includes interest. PAYABLE IN THREE ANNUAL 
INSTALLMENTS OF $60,000.00 EACH, AND THE BALANCE OF $120 ,000 .00 , 
IN ONE FINAL PAYMENT, SAiD PAYMENTS MAY BE PAID ANY TIME AT THE 
DESCRETiONO- THE BUYER, and upon wrtten notice from tne NIELSEN'S or 
their assigns within 130 cteys fall-wing the termination of said 
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM CONTRACT. PETERSEN'S further agree 
to piace Wan-arty Deeds in Escrow with this agreement to be delivered. 
:o NIELSEN'S or their assigns uccn exercise of the OPTION contained fn 
this paragraph, and hereby also agree to provide a policy of TITLE 
INSURANCE showing the prooerty to be'free and clear of encumbrance in 
the name of the NIELSEN'S or their assigns. 
4 inccnsideration for the agreement of the PETERSEN'S to grant said 
lease and option. The Petersens, Lyiwcod Developement Corp and 
NIELSEN'S agree to the following: 
A LYNWCOD Devsicpement Corp. shall recieve s!l proceeds from crops 
grown on the Farm during 1966 and shall be r e s o ^ ' h i o f"f **» 'QP-fi >**> 
oh or property ***•'•* 
B. NIELSEN'S & Lt'NV/OOD further agree that at -the request of the 
PETERSEN'S, to cause the CONSERVATION RESERVE ACREAGE, to be 
planted to grass as required under the program provided the Petersen's 
sign for, and recieve the payments provided for establishment of grass 
on the conservattjn acres and pay the payments so recieved or their 
equivalent to LYNWCOD DEV. CORP. for providing the material, 
equiptment, and labor to plant the conservation reserve. 
C This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, assigns, and 
successors tc this agreement. 
itfrari 
0. 17 ic qrrr,r..,,7pn py THp P / n T S TO TMtc AfiCgFFMgMT THAT-THIS 
ArpprMFMT yt;gT jy APPPOV-D AND ORpgRgf) RV THF .lnnffP-flF THF 
BANKRUPTS fCtST QT 7-F ! WTFD 5TATFS IM TH? FVPMT HP FAll HRF OF 
THF PABT|CS
 1N Cgr,.piHfi S1)TH APPROVAL ANnORPFQ TH1* APPFPHFUT 
AND AH flF THP TPPMC HFPFOF SH*I I. SF. OF NO FOPCF OP prpPCT AND 
THIS FMT'PC AffSFPfi^T SWA11 flg Nil!! AMR VOID 
E. !n event of aefaUt of tne terms of tnis agreement -the 
prevailing aarty sna" be entitled tc legal fee's and costs'"of 
enforcement nerccf. 
INV/ITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands and 
seals this jLl±. aay of-Juty.1986. 
y C l ^ / r^-rf^^ ^Mj. TZ-QJZTZ 
PEED L PETERSEN1 / ;•;... ETHEL L PETERSEN 
^ • • : • / — • ' • • > _ / 
.s . , />-
y - \ 
-O 
NCRj?ANjL. PETERSEN^"/ MYME r. PETERSEN 
PERC^E. PETERSEN INEZ-'d PETERSEN 
> > 
ESTATE Of 3E:RG! A N. PETERSEN 3Y LAVERN'H. PETERSEN 
ELW0C0LNI5LSEK LYNI^ NIELSEN 
LYNWC6: DEVELCPEMENT CCRP. WITNESS 
by LYNN NIELSEN PRESIDENT ELWOOD L' NIELSEN. 5EC 
EXHIBIT "B" 
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER, AUGUST 21, 1991 
IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA * » L £ lJ 
REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL 
PETERSEN, h u s b a"l T a n^ WiJSE NORMAN L. PETERSEN and MYME 
PETERSEN, husband and wife, 
LAVERN H. P E T E R S E N a f 0 ^ t h f 
H. PETERSEN, ^ ^ p j L r s e n , 
Estate of Georgia N.Petersen, 
PERCY E. PETERSEN and INEZ H. 
PETERSEN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN 
NIELSEN, husband and wife, 
LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP., a 
Utah corporation; and GRANT 
THORNTON, Trustee of the 
Bankruptcy Estate of Elwood 
Leslie Nielsen and Lynn 
Nielsen; DALE F. TUBBS and 
KATHLEEN F. TUBBS, husband 
and wife; VALLEY BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a banking 
corporation of Utah, 
Defendants. 
AT_ O-CLCCK. 
DATE __4r^fe.-..*/. 
JOYCE H. FRElDEMeCRGSS. 
Clerk Of District Ccurt 
CASE NO. 7-874ji 
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER 
RECEIVED AUG 2 6 B9I 
In October of 1975 the Petersen family entered into a contract 
to sell the family farm property in Malad Idaho to Dale and 
Kathleen F. Tubbs. On February 24, 1983 the Tubbs assigned their 
rights to the Malad Farm to Elwood and Lynn Nielsen. This 
assignment was accepted by the Petersen family and memorialized in 
writing and incorporated the original Petersen-Tubbs agreement. 
In February of 198 6, defendants Nielsen filed for Chapter 11, 
S E M ^ D ^ ' D E C I S I O M . ORDER 
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reorganization, bankruptcy in Utah. During the pendency of the 
bankruptcy action, the Petersens and the Nielsens again entered 
into an agreement to lease of the farm property. This "lease 
agreement" was dependent upon the acceptance of the bankruptcy 
trustee. At that time, the bankruptcy trustee accepted the lease; 
however, the bankruptcy estate was then converted to a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, liquidation, in January 1988. 
Because the Chapter 11 trustee's approval of the lease was 
voidable when the estate was converted to Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the 
Malad Farm was again brought back into the bankruptcy estate. At 
this time, the plaintiffs hired a Utah attorney to procure the 
release of the property from the bankruptcy trustee. The 
bankruptcy court has since approved the abandonment of the Malad 
Farm from the bankruptcy estate on the grounds that the amount owed 
exceeds the current market value of the property. The plaintiffs 
now seek to clear their title to the property. 
This Court, on its motion, sought briefing from the parties as 
to the effect of the bankruptcy, which agreement or agreements 
govern the parties relationship, and, thus, this litigation, and 
which state law applies. At this time, this Court will resolve 
those issues. 
i. EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY AND GOVERNING AGREEMENTS 
The conversion of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy to Chapter 7 
voided the trustee's prior approval of the lease. See e.g. In re 
Manchester Lakes Associates, 117 B.R. 221, 224 (1990) ("The lien is 
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,ade voidable rather than void in chapter 7, in order to permit the 
.ien to be revived if the case is converted to chapter 11....J* 
The lease agreement, at paragraph 4.D. specifically provides: 
"IT IS RECOGNIZED BY THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT THAT 
THIS AGREEMENT MUST BE APPROVED AND ORDERED BY THE JUDGE OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT OT TSICI THE UNITED STATES. IN THE EVENT 
OF FAILURE OF THE PARTIES IN SECURING SUCH APPROVAL AND ORDER. 
THIS AGREEMENT AND ALL OF THE TERMS HEREOF SHALL BE OF NO 
FORCE OR EFFECT AND THIS ENTIRE AGREEMENT SHALL BE NULL AND 
VOID." 
A trial court has the discretion to determine whether a 
contract is ambiguous or not. See e.g. Hoffman v. United Silver 
Mines, Inc. , 116 Idaho 240, 245, 775 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1989). A 
contract which is not ambiguous is construed by the trial court as 
a matter of law. As stated in Haener v. Ada County Highway 
District, 108 Idaho 170, 173, 697 P.2d 1185 (1985), "the 
interpretation of the written contract and of the intent of the 
parties is a matter for the trial judge's discretion." 
This Court finds that the "lease agreement" is not ambiguous. 
Therefore, this court may interpret as-a matter of law the meaning 
of that contract. The above quoted disclaimer clearly outlines the 
parties' intent .to void the "lease agreement" if the bankruptcy 
court does not agree to the lease. Although the necessary approval 
was, initially, granted, the approval was voidable. When the 
bankruptcy estate was converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, the approval of the court was voided. Thus, without 
the approval of the bankruptcy court, by its provisions the "lease 
agreement" is void. 
CASE NO. 7-874 
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Thus, in the absence of the lease agreement, the governing 
greement must be the written assignment which incorporates the 
original Petersen-Tubbs agreement. 
Case law clearly demonstrates that abandonment by the trustee 
"immediately revests title to that asset in the bankrupt," in re 
Polumbo 271 F.Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Virginia 1967)(citing In re 
Thomas, 204 F.2d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 1953); See also' Brown v. 
O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602, 57 S.Ct. 543, 546, 81 L.Ed. 827 (1937); 
Mason v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir. 
198 0)("When a court grants a trustee's petition to abandon property 
in a bankrupt's estate, any title that was vested in the trustee is* 
extinguished, and the title reverts to the bankrupt, nunc pro 
tunc.11); Wallace v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 338 F.2d 392, 394 n.l 
(9th Cir. 1964); Rosenblum v. Dincrfelder. Ill F.2d 406, 409 (2nd 
jir. 194 0) . Although the removal of the property from the 
banckruptcy estate was accomplished by the Petersen family, the 
revision would technically be to the contract purchasers and; thus, 
the Nielsens still retain a possessory interest. 
The remedies provided for in the assignment and the Petersen-
Tubbs agreement govern continuing possession, 
II. CHOICE OF STATE LAW 
The terms of the Petersen-Tubbs agreement, at paragraph 21, 
express a choice-of-law agreement for application of Utah law. As 
a general principle, contracting parties are free to select the 
applicable state law through a choice-of-law clause or the 
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applicable through a forum clause. See generally M/S Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 32 L.Ed.2d 513, 92 S.Ct. 1907 
(1972) ; Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Enerowave Corp.. 116 Idaho 56, 773 
P.2d 1143 (1989); Idaho Code § 28-1-105(1) (applying to the sale 
of goods only); Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187. 
However, this general principle is limited by both public 
policy concerns and to situations wherein the selected forum state 
has a substantial relationship to the parties or transaction. See 
e.g. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 32 L.Ed.2d 
513, 523, 92 S.Ct. 1907 (1972); Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Enerovwave 
Corp. , 116 Idaho 56, 773 P.2d 1143 (1989); Idaho Code § 28-1-
105(1) (applying to the sale of goods only); Restatement (Second) 
of Conflicts of Laws § 187; Annotation, Validity of Contractual 
Provision Limiting Place or Court In Which Action May be BroughtP 
31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 408 (1984). 
In the case at hand, it is clear that the State of Utah has 
some interest in this contract. All of the parties are residents 
of Utah, the contract was executed in Utah, the defendant is 
incorporated in Utah and the bankruptcy proceedings were proceeding 
in a federal court in Utah. However, the real property at issue 
is located in the State of Idaho. 
According to Zapata, supra, "A contractual choice-of-forum 
clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene 
a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought, 
whether declared by statute or by judicial decision." Id. at U.S. 
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25, L.Ed.2d at 523, citing Bovd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co.. 338 U.S. 
263, 94 L.Ed. 55, 70 S.Ct. 26 (1949). See accord Cerami-Kote. 
supra. By analogy, this public policy concern applies to a choice-
of-law clause as well. Thus, raising a query "Would the 
application of Utah law to a foreclosure/quiet title action for 
real property within the State of Idaho contravene a strong public 
policy interest In Idaho?" 
As demonstrated by Idaho probate and intestate law, Idaho 
asserts the right to have Idaho law govern the distribution of all 
real property located in this state but owned by a nonresident 
decedent. This statute, Idaho Code § 15-1-3 01 provides in part: 
"Except as otherwise provided in this code, this code applies to 
(2) the property of nonresidents located in this state...." Thus, 
Idaho statutory law governing probate clearly indicates a statutory 
dictate inferring a right to Idaho Courts to govern the title and 
right pertaining to land in this State. By analogy, this public 
policy principle may be attributed to.Idaho•s interest in having 
Idaho law govern the adjudication and clearing of title or forclose 
on real property located within the State of Idaho, even though the 
owners, or other parties in interest may be nonresidents and/or may 
have agreed to be governed by the law of another state. 
The right to determine which party has title to real property 
within the State of Idaho should be governed by Idaho law. Thus, 
this court will apply Idaho law to the foreclosure proceedings 
under the Petersen-Tubbs agreement and assignment. 
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DATED this 21st day of August, 1991. 
WILLIAM H. WOODLAND 
District Judge 
S u f S ^ S ^ S S n S i « Broadway-lH* . locr-SLC .4101) 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
DECREE FORECLOSING MORTGAGE AND ORDERING SALE, APRIL 26,1993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL 
PETERSEN, husband and wife, 
NORMAN L. PETERSEN and MYME 
PETERSEN, husband and wife, 
LAVERN H. PETERSEN and 
LAVERN H. PETERSEN, Executor 
of the Estate of Georgia N. 
Petersen, PERCY E. PETERSEN 
and INEZ H. PETERSEN, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN 
NIELSEN, husband and wife, 
LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP., a 
Utah corporation; and 
GRANT THORNTON, Trustee of the 
Bankruptcy Estate of Elwood 
Leslie Nielsen and Lynn 
Nielsen; DALE F. TUBBS and 
KATHLEEN F. TUBBS, husband and 
wife; VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a banking corporation 
of Utah, 
Defendants, 
CASE NO. 7-874 
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THE ABOVE entitled cause came on to be heard before this court on August 31, 1992 
on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. F. Randall Kline, Attorney, appeared for the 
plaintiffs, and representatives for the plaintiffs also appeared. Defendant Elwood Ncilson 
appeared pro se. 
Exhib i t "B" 
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The court having reviewed the file, the affidavits submitted and briefs of counsel, being 
fully advised in the premises, and having heard arguments of counsel, for good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. All property as set forth and described in the complaint in this cause and subsequently 
particularly described in Exhibit A shall be sold as a unit at a public auction according to law. 
2. The plaintiff or any parties to this suit may purchase the property at such sale. 
3. The sale is to be made at public auction for cash by the Sheriff of the county of 
Oneida. The Sheriff shall retain his statutory fcts, disbursements and compensations out of the 
proceeds of the sale, and pay plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney the following sums out of the 
remaining proceeds, or as much as die proceeds permit. 
4. Assuming the plaintiffs receive die CRP payment in October 1992, the principal and 
interest balance at this time shall be set at 5564,338.41, with interest at 12% per annum from 
October 1, 1992 to the time of payment as found by this court to be due and owing plaintiffs on 
defendants' debts and notes which are secured by the mortgage foreclosed herein. 
S 22/814.81 for property taxes paid by the plaintiff, S 11/768.00 allowed by this court 
as attorneys fees and S 642.40 to plaintiff as costs for suit and litigation. Plaintiffs 
affidavit attached to this Motion sQts forth the amounts he has expended for taxes and attorneys 
fees in pursuit of this matter, and the affidavit of F. Randall Kline, current counsel for Plaintiff 
Reed Petersen, also sets forth die amounts of attomys fees incurred in die prosecution of this 
matter and paid by Reed Petersen, 
5. The sheriff shall present receipts of die amounts paid as stated above to this court 
together with die Sheriffs return and die report of sale. The sheriff shall return any surplus 
Decree for Closing Mortgage and Ordering Sale 
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monies which may remain after applying the proceeds of sale as designated within ten days after 
making the sale. Such surplus, if any, shall abide the further order of this court. 
6. The defendants Elwood and Lynn Nielsen are personally liable for the amounts set 
forth above, and should the proceeds of sale be insufficient to pay those sums, the court will 
render a judgment against the defendants and each of them for the deficient amount, and the 
court retains jurisdiction for that purpose. 
7. The sheriff shall execute and deliver a deed to the property to the purchasers at the 
sale, and the purchasers shall be let into possession of the property. 
8. The defendants and all persons claiming under them be and are hereby forever barred 
and foreclosed of all equity and redemption and claim to the mortgage, and all parts of the 
mortgage property, except for such right of redemption as they may have by law from the sale. 
9. The plaintiffs are placed in the position of receiver with regard to the property to 
manage, control and possess the property until such time of sale. 
10. Defendants and each of them and their agents are enjoined from committing any 
waste upon the premises. 
11. The defendants and each of them are allowed and permitted ten days from the date 
of this order to remove any items of personal property including farm equipment from the 
premises. However, no fixtures shall be removed and no waste shall be committed on the 
premises. 
12. The defendants are currendy growing a crop of safflower on the premises of 
approximately 140 acres. The defendants shall be allowed to enter the premises to harvest the 
Decree for Closing Mortgage and Ordering Sale 
Page 3 
041 
crop at the appropriate time and receive proceeds from die crop, including disaster or insurance 
payments on said crop. 
SO ORDERED this j ff day of-<Jd&M- 1993 
STRICT C(5URTJLJDGE 
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, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ i ^ *Y < * & & * » « . < « * « * « " » * 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the Mowing person(s) as follows: 
Elwood & Lynn Nielsen 
P.O. Box 1944 
Sandy, UT 84091 
Brad R. Baldwin 
50 West Broadway, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
E. L. Scott 
P.O. Box 145 
44 North Main 
Malad, ID 83252 
F. Randall Kline 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 397 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
I f U.S. Mail postage prepaid 
[ | Hand Delivery 
I 1 Express Delivery 
\^\},S. Mail postage prepaid 
[ J Hand Delivery 
[ 1 Express Delivery 
(L^U.S. Mail postage prepaid 
[ J Hand Delivery 
I ] Express Delivery 
U.S. Mail Postage prepaid 
Clerk of the Court 
^ L W s s f u 
Decree for Closing Mortgage and Ordering Sale 
Page 5 
EXHIBIT "D" 
ORDER RE: CONTEMPT, NOVEMBER 9, 1994 
F. Randall Kline. Esauire 
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED 
427 N. Main St.. Suite L 
P.O. Box 397 
Pocateilo. Idaho 83204-0397 
Telephone: (208) 232-9007 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
( H i £ D 
gr.n&T^S.; aaccsc.^..,v. 
DATS H-'D-.4.if. 
JCYC2 H. FxE!CEN££=.Gc3. 
Clerk erf CisUta Caxr 
OfPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL 
PETERSEN, husband and wife, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN 
NIELSEN, husband and wife. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 88-7,874 
Judge: Woodland 
ORDER RE: CONTEMPT 
The matter of an Order to Show Cause for Contempt having come before the 
Court on or about September 30, 1994, F. Randall Kline appeared for the Plaintiffs, and Fred 
J. Lewis appeared for the defendants. The matter before the Court is an Order to Show Cause 
for Contempt relative to two specific instances. 
The first matter deals with the preparation and recording in me real estate records 
of Oneida County, a document entitled "Notice of Interest in Real Property", Instrument No. 
119382. The history of this matter indicates that a suit for quiet title was filed in December of 
1988 relative to real property in Oneida County, Idaho which is attached to Instrument No. 
119382 as Exhibit A. The matter having been litigated and an amended complaint having been 
prepared and filed dealing with the foreclosure of the mortgage. A Motion for Summary 
Page 1 fi 88-2012* PLAINTIFFS fRDER RE: CONTEMPT ]J BRmrT I 
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Judgment having come before the Court on or about September 1, 1992 wherein the Court 
verbally ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, Petersens, and against defendants, El wood 
and Lynn Nielsen. However, prior to the Court executing the written order, Nielsens filed a 
bankruptcy in the State of Nevada, claiming to be residents of Nevada. That action was 
ultimately dismissed in April of 1993. Whereafter, the Court in this matter executed the 
Foreclosure Order foreclosing defendants' interest in the property and ordering that the property 
be sold. This Court had previously ordered that the agreement, attached as Exhibit D to 
Instrument No. 119382, was an unenforceable and voidable instrument and terminated the 
operation of said contract. However, in contravention of the Court's Order, defendants, 
Nielsens, filed the "Notice of Interest in Real Property" on or about the 22nd day of July, 1993 
and recorded the same in the Oneida County Real Estate Records. Document No. 119382 was 
filed during the time of a pending appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court challenging the 
Foreclosure Order. The "Notice of Interest in Real Property" appears to be an attempt to 
disregard the Court's prior Order entered in Oneida County Case CV-88-7-874, relative to the 
affect and operation of the Lease and Option to Purchase: 
"This Agreement is in full, force and effect as of the date of this notice 
together with the legal right of possession by the undersigned and together with 
the right, title or interest granted thereto and said interest is to remain vested in 
the undersigned or the heirs or assigns until exercise or expiration thereof. 
Date this 1st day of July, 1993". 
It would appear that the filing of the document is in contravention of the Court's 
prior Orders and is an effort to place a cloud on the title following the Order of Foreclosure. 
After lengthy negotiations and discussions among and between the parties, it 
appears that settlement cannot be reached in this matter. However, in an attempt to purge 
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themselves of contempt, the defendants, Elwood L. Nielsen and Lynn Nielsen, indicated through 
counsel that they would file a document terminating the affect and operation of Instrument No. 
119382, Additionally, Fred J. Lewis, attorney for Nielsens indicated that he would contact the 
trustee immediately to also obtain a release of the "Notice of Interest in Real Property". Thereby 
waiving any and all interests, if any, that Lynn Nielsen's current bankruptcy estate may claim 
under the terms of the "Notice of Interest in Real Property". 
The second issue pending before the Court dealt with the allegations that Elwood 
L. Nielsen entered upon the real property of the Petersens in contravention of the Court's Order 
restraining such activity and removed certain items of property including a truck, a boat, a trailer 
with four wheelers, and miscellaneous unknown and undisclosed property. Counsel for Petersens 
indicated that he would reserve that contempt matter for the present time. 
IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER OF THE COURT that the "Notice of Claim of 
Interest" in the Petersen farm [Exhibit "A"l is void and of no force and effect. Also, that 
Nielsens terminate said "Notice" by retracting the "Notice". Nielsens are further ordered to 
work with the trustee of Lynn Nielsen's bankruptcy in Utah to obtain appropriate releases of 
claim of interest in this real property. 
Counsel for Petersens also requested that costs and fees be awarded. It appears 
clear from the record that the "Notice of Interest in Real Property" recordation is a contemptible 
action and, therefore, costs and attorneys fees shall be awarded in the amount of %/y/ 
and for additional judgment against Elwood L. Nielsen. 
DATED this Qr^ day of November, 1994. 
William H. Woodland 
Sixth District Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the m^-day of November, 1994, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following parties, postage prepaid thereon, 
in the manner indicated below: 
F. Randall Kline, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0 . Box 397 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0397 
j ^ U . S . Mail 
m Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Fax 
Fred J. Lewis, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
'U.S. Mail 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Fax 
Deputy Clerk 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
ORDER QUIETING TITLE, JUNE 14, 1996 
E x h i b i t "D" 
F. Randall Kline, Esquire 
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED 
427 N. Main St., Suite L 
P.O. Box 397 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0397 
Telephone: (208) 232-9007 
Attorney for Piaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL 
PETERSEN, husband and wife. 
NORMAN L. PETERSEN and MAYME 
PETERSEN, husband and wife, 
LAVERN H. PETERSEN and LAVERN 
PETERSEN, Executor of the 
Estate of GEORGIA N. 
PETERSEN, PERCY E. PETERSEN 
and INEZ H. PETERSEN, husband 
and wife. 
Piaintiffs/Counter-defendants, 
vs. 
EL WOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN 
NIELSEN, husband and wife, 
LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
Utah corporation; and GRANT 
THORNTON, Trustee of the 
Bankruptcy Estate of Elwood 
Leslie Nielsen and Lynn 
Nielsen; DALE F. TUBBS and 
KATHLEEN F. TUBBS, husband and 
wife, VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a banking corporation 
of Utah. 
Defendants, 
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN 
NIELSEN, husband and wife. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
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A Motion having been filed by the Plaintiffs, Reed Petersen and Ethel Petersen, husband 
and wife, Norman L. Petersen and Mayme Petersen, husband and wife; LaVern H. Petersen, 
individually and as executor of the estate of Georgia N. Petersen; and Percy E. Petersen and Inez 
H. Petersen, husband and wife, (hereinafter jointly "Petersens"), in the above-entided action, the 
Court makes the following findings: 
1. This action was commenced for abandonment and quiet tide in December 1988. 
2. A Decree foreclosing die mortgage and ordering sale came on for hearing on 
August 31, 1992, the Order having been executed by the Court: on April 26, 1993. 
3. The Court is aware and is mindful that tiiere have been multiple appeals and 
bankruptcies regarding the property, more particularly described in Exhibit "A", attached hereto 
and incorporated herein. 
4. Based upon representadons, it appears that all ancillary matters have now been 
completed or resolved. 
5. The property was sold at the Sheriffs Sale dated March 3, 1994. The time period 
for statutory redemption has lapsed. The Sheriffs Deed was issued March 6, 1995, as 
Instrument No. 121399 in the Oneida County records. 
6- No other party has a claim or interest in the described property superior to that 
of Petersens. 
THEREFORE, based upon the record and upon the Motion, Supporting Affidavit, and 
for good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The property which is die subject matter of this litigation and controversy, more 
particularly described in Exhibit "A\ is hereby quieted in Reed Petersen and Ethel Petersen, 
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husband and wife, Norman L. Petersen and Mayme Petersen, husband and wife; LaVcrn H. 
Petersen, individually and as executor of the estate of Georgia N. Petersen; and Percy E. 
Petersen and Inez H. Petersen, husband and wife, free and clear of any and all claims. 
2. The Petersens have full right, tide, and interest in said described property. 
DATED this Jf^day of June, 1996. 
A-»v4 
/William H. Woodland 
Sixth District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \<& day of June, 1996, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to the following parties, postage prepaid thereon, in die manner 
indicated below: 
Brent T. Robinson 
LING, NIELSEN & ROBINSON 
P. 0. Box 396 
Rupert, Idaho 83350 
F. Randall Kline, Esq. 
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED 
P. 0. Box 397 
Pocateilo, Idaho 83204-0397 
U.S. Mail 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Fax 
1}.S. Mail 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Fax 
^ V y ^ - - Q U n a - f r 
*rr Deputy Clerk 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
TRACT 1: 
Township 15 South, Range 33 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section 36: NV4; SEW; EV4SWK 
Township 16 South, Range 33 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section I: ALL 
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section 31: Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4; NEKSWK 
TRACT 2: 
Township 15 South, Range 33 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section 36: WV4SWW 
Township 16 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section 6: N'A 
TRACT 3: 
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section 29: NV&SWW; SWWSWK 
Section 30: SEW; SEKSWW; SEKNEW; Lot 4 
TRACT 4: 
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section 31: NE%; EV&SEW; E'ANWW; NWV4SEK 
TRACT 5: 
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian: 
Section 31: SW'4SelA; SE V4SW% 
Together widi and including all grazing rights, permits, 
and allotments appurtenant to die real property 
CASE NO. 7-874 ORDER QUIETING TITLE 
EXHIBIT "F" 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, NOVEMBER 1, 1996 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
REED L. PETERSEN, et al, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
Plaintiffs-Counter- ) FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents, ) 
) NO. 23178 
v. ) 
) Ref. No- 965-304 
ELWCOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN NIELSEN,) 
husband and wife, ) 
Defendants-Counter- ) 
Claimants-Appellants, ) 
and ) 
LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al, ) 
Defendants. ) 
A MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL with supporting 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL with attachments and BRIEF was filed by-
Respondents October 3, 1996. An OBJECTION TO RESPONDENTSf MOTION 
TO DISMISS APPEAL with attachments was filed by Appellants 
October 21, 1996. The Court is fully advised; therefore, after d'sie 
consideration 
IT' HEREBY IS ORDERED that the MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF' 
APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED 
based upon the parties1 stipulation filed in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, Nc. 
94B-22877, Chapter 7, in Re: Lynn Nielsen, debtor. 
DATED this J day of November, 1996. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge W. H. Woodland 
Reporter L. Larson 
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EXHIBIT "G" 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, APRIL 22, 1999 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
Case No. CV-97-566 
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT ) 
COMPANY, a .Utah Partnership, ) 
ETHEL PETERSEN, general ) 
partner, CURTIS PETERSEN, ) 
ROBERT PETERSEN, DIXIE ) 
JACKSON, Limited Partners; ) 
NORMAN L. PETERSEN (deceased) ) 
and MAYME PETERSEN, and their ) 
successors in interest ) 
BETTY RUSSELL and LOUISE ) 
HARBINSON, LAVERN H. ) 
PETERSEN and PERCY E. ) 
PETERSEN, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
-vs- ) 
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and F. ) 
STANLEY NIELSEN, ) 
Defendants. ) 
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On April 5, 1999, the Court took motions under advisement in 
this case. Now it issues its decision in this case. The Court 
GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to 
the slander of title "claim, the declaratory judgment claims, the 
prayer for an order to strike, etc., and the injunctive relief; 
GRANTS summary judgment to the Defendants as to the Quiet Title 
Action; and GRANTS summary judgment to the Plaintiffs as to the 
Counterclaim. All contrary motions are also DENIED. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that 
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions' and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 
Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P. 
56(c)); see also Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City 
of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. 
Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 890 P.2d 331 (1995). In making this 
determination, a Court should liberally construe the record in 
favor of the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions in that party' s'favor. Smith, 128 
Idaho at 718, 918 P.2d at 587 (citing Friel v. Boise City Hous. 
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Page 2 
13K 
Auth.r 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994)). If 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence, summary judgment must 
be denied. Id. (citing Harris v. Department ~of Health & Welfare, 
123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)). However, if the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then 
summary judgment should be granted. Id., 128 Idaho at 718-719, 
918 P. 2d at 587-88 (citing Loomis v. City of Haileyr 119 Idaho 
434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991)). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact rests at all times with the party moving for 
summary judgment. Id., 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P. 2d at 588 (citing 
Tlngley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994)). 
In order to meet its burden, the moving party must challenge in 
its motion and establish through evidence the absence of any 
genuine issue of material fact on an element of the nonmoving 
party's case. Id. (citing Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 
126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994)). If the moving 
party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence 
establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact on 
that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, 
and the nonmoving party is not required to'respond with 
supporting evidence. Id. (citing Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530, 887 
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P.2d at 1038)). However, if the moving party cnallenges an 
element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to 
the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine issue of fact. Id. (citing Tingley, 125 Idaho 
at 90, 867 P.2d at 964). Summary judgment is properly granted in 
favor of the moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. 
Id. (citing Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d at 1037-38; 
Badell v. Beeks, 115. Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126 (1988)). The 
party opposing the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the 
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(e)). .The 
nonmoving party's case must be anchored in something more than 
speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to 
create a genuine issue of fact. Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, 
Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 868 P.2d 473 (1994)) (plaintiff who produces 
mere scintilla of evidence, or otherwise raises only slight doubt 
as to facts, will not withstand summary judgment); Nelson v. 
Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). If the nonmoving 
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party does not come forward as provided in the rule, then summary 
judgment should be entered against that party. State v. Shama 
Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 980 
(1995) . 
Although both parties in the instant case have moved for 
summary judgment, it does not in and of itself establish that 
there is no genuine issue of fact. Kromrei v. Aid Ins. Co. 
(Mut)
 r 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986); Casey v. 
Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 507, 600 P.2d 1387, 1389 
(1979) . However, where all the parties file motions for summary 
judgment relying on the same facts, issues, and theories, the 
parties essentially stipulate that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact which would preclude the district court from 
entering summary judgment. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191, 
923 P.2d 434, 436 (1996); Morrissey v. Haley, 124 Idaho 870, 872, 
865 P.2d 961, 963 (1993); Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 
Idaho 515, 518-19, 650 P.2d 657, 660-61 (1982). 
Where one party to an action has moved for summary judgment, 
summary judgment may be granted to a nonmoving party, if there 
are; no genuine issues of material fact and if the nonmoving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miner v. Farmers 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 116 Idaho 656, 659, 778 P.2d 778, 781 (1989) 
(citing Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Ldaho 338, 345, 766 P. 2d 
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1219, 1226 (1988); Juker v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 102 
Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981)). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Court adopts the facts outlined in the December 9, 1998 
Memorandum Decision and Order in making this decision, except as 
outlined below: 
Amended Fact 2: On February 24, 1983, the Tubbs assigned 
their rights in the Petersen Farm to Lynn and Elwood. Lynn and 
Elwood did not pay Petersen as mandated by the contract. In 
February, 1986, Lynn and Elwood filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in Utah. 
Amended Fact 3: During the pendency of the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, Petersen and Lynn and Elwood entered into an 
agreement (hereinafter referred to as the 'Mease/option 
agreement"), wherein .title to the Petersen Farm would be restored 
to Petersen, and Lynn and Elwood would have a ten year lease with 
an option to purchase. The lease/option agreement was dependent 
upon the approval of the bankruptcy trustee, who thereafter 
approved the lease/option agreement. However, Lynn and Elwood 
thereafter converted their bankruptcy from Chapter 11 to Chapter 
7 in January, 1988. 
Amended Fact 4: Upon conversion to the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, the Petersen Farm was abandoned from the bankruptcy 
at Petersen's request. Petersen was also granted relief from the 
Chapter 7 automatic stay and was allowed to pursue their remedy 
outside of bankruptcy. 
Amended Fact 5: In 1991, the Court held, in Case No. 7-
874: 
The conversion of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy to 
Chapter 7 voided the trustee's prior approval of the 
lease.... 
A trial court has the discretion to determine 
whether a contract is ambiguous or not. A contract 
which is not ambiguous is construed by the trial court 
as a matter of law. As stated in Haener v. Ada County 
Highway District, 108 Idaho 170, 173, 697 P.2d 1185 
(1985), "the interpretation of the written contract and 
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of the intent of the parties is a matter for the trial 
judge's discretion." 
This Court finds that the "lease agreement" is not 
ambiguous. Therefore, this court may interpret as a 
matter of law the meaning of that contract. The above 
quoted disclaimer clearly outlines the parties' intent 
to void the "lease agreement" if the bankruptcy court 
does not agree to the lease. Although the necessary 
approval was, initially, granted, the approval was 
voidable. When the bankruptcy estate was converted 
from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the approval 
of the court was voided. Thus, without the approval of 
the bankruptcy court, by its provisions the "lease 
agreement" is void. 
Thus, in the absence of the lease agreement, the 
governing agreement must be the written assignment 
which incorporates the original Petersen-Tubbs 
agreement. 
The Court also finds the following additional facts to be the 
relevant facts in determining these motions. 
22. The Petersen Farm was released from the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in October, 1986. The lease/option agreement was 
never assumed by the trustee, either in Chapter 11 or in Chapter 
7 bankruptcy. 
23. The Defendants sent the Court a March 1, 1999 letter 
consenting to the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. On March 
5, 1999, Stanley Nielsen Answered the Second Amended Complaint 
and filed a Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
A. Slander of Title 
In order to maintain a cause of action for slander of title, 
the claimant has the burden of showing: (1) uttering or 
publishing of slanderous statements; (2) when the statements were 
false; (3) with malice; and (4) resulting in special damages. 
Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 897, 934 P.2d 951, 963 (Ct. App. 
1997) (citing Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 760-761, 572 P.2d 
861, 863-64 (1997); Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 
123 Idaho 862, 869, 853 P.2d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The Court has already addressed this issue as to Stanley 
Nielsen in, its December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order. 
There is no additional evidence now presented to the Court to 
change that decision as to Stanley Nielsen. Therefore, the 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to slander of title must 
be granted as to Defendant, Stanley Nielsen. 
The Court also addressed slander of title in its December 9, 
1998 Memorandum Decision and Order as to Defendant, Elwood L. 
Nielsen. There, the Court denied summary judgment to Elwood 
Nielsen as to slander of title. However, the Court now GRANTS 
this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding slander of 
title as to Elwood Nielsen, because no special damages have been 
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shown by the Plaintiffs. Except as to special damages, the Court 
adopts the December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order as to 
the other three elements of slander of title by Elwood L. 
Nielsen. 
In Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 530, 700 
P.2d 567, 573 (1985), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the proof 
of special damages. There, the court held that (1) the expenses 
of legal proceedings (including attorney fees) necessary to 
remove a cloud on the plaintiff's title or other expenses to 
counteract the disparagement and/or (2) the loss of a particular 
pending sale could all be special damages in a slander of title 
action. 
There are no losses of pending sales of real property 
alleged in the Second Amended Complaint for Slander of Title, nor 
were there any alleged in the first complaints filed herein. The 
issue has always been whether the attorney fees being billed to 
the Plaintiffs by Mr. Kline for maintaining this action could be 
those special damages. 
In Rayl v. Shull Enterprisesr Inc., 108 Idaho at 525, 700 
P.2d at 568, the plaintiff brought a quiet title claim (seeking 
to remove a labor lien) and a slander of title claim in the same 
action. The Idaho Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to use the 
attorney fees he had paid to bring the quiet title claim as 
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special damages in the slander of title claim. Based en that 
decision, this Court has continually questioned Plaintiffs 
counsel concerning whether they were maintaining quiet title 
actions.and/or declaratory judgment actions in this case (because 
the attorney fees for maintaining one or both of those actions 
would be the special damages the Plaintiffs would be required to 
prove). Until the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. 
Kline has always stipulated that this action was not brought to 
quiet title in the property (even as to Stanley Nielsen). In his 
briefs opposing Mr. Nielsen's Motion for Reconsideration of the 
December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order, Mr. Kline also 
stipulated that these actions were not brought to seek a 
declaratory judgment. Not until the Second Amended Complaint did 
the Plaintiffs allege a claim to quiet the title in this property 
and/or a claim for a declaratory judgment. Therefore, there have 
been no damages which have been incurred as special damages until 
the Plaintiffs1 pursuit of that Second Amended Complaint. 
The quiet title claim and the declaratory judgment claim in 
that Second Amended Complaint have been dismissed by this 
decision. There are therefore no special damages to be alleged 
and proven in a slander of title claim. Having failed to prove 
the final element of a slander of title claim, it must also be 
dismissed as to Elwood L. Nielsen. 
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3. Other claims. 
The Plaintiffs request that the Court determine that (1) tne 
option is of no force and effect, void and unenforceable; (2) 
strike tjie assignment from the records of Bannock County; and (3) 
issue an injunction to prevent further clouding of the title by 
the Defendants and/or either of them. 
The validity of the option agreement is determined in the 
part of this decision relating to the counterclaim for breach of 
contract, so it will not be addressed here. Where there is a 
pending action which involves the identical issues raised in a 
declaratory judgment action, it is proper for the district court 
to dismiss the request for declaratory relief. Scott v. 
Agricultural Products Corp., 102 Idaho 147, 627 P.2d 326 (1981). 
The Court finds no authority for the request for an order to 
strike, invalidate, remove, and terminate the assignment of the 
option from the Oneida County real estate records. The Court 
therefore will not grant such request. The Court however holds 
that a recorded decision eliminating an option (which was 
previously recorded) accomplishes the same result. 
The decision whether to grant an injunction is committed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court. O'Boskey v. First Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Assn., 112 Idaho 1002, 1007, 739 P.2d 301, 306 
(1987); Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471, 479, 406 
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?.2d 113, 115 (1965). An injunction can only issue to restrain 
the commission of a future or contemplated action, and the writ 
will not be granted to restrain an act which has already 
occurred. Roberts v. Kartzke, 18 Idaho 552, 111 P. 1 (1910); 
Wilson v. City of Boise City, 7 Idaho 69, 60 P. 84 (1900). 
Injunctions should issue only where irreparable injury is 
actually threatened, where conduct causing that injury has been 
discontinued, the injunction should be denied. However, the 
trial court must be convinced by the defendant that there is no 
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated. O'Boskey 
v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Association of Boise, 112 Idaho at 
1007, 739 P.2d at 306. The Court finds that this action (claims 
and counterclaims) will end the dispute between these parties. 
The decision regarding the validity or invalidity of the option 
will end this dispute. Therefore, an injunction is not 
appropriate. 
At the April 5, 1999 hearing, the Defendants withdrew the 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Quiet Title 
Action. 
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - QUIET TITLE ACTION 
Precisely because a claim of title is a general claim of 
ownership of the property, a complaint to quiet title is 
sufficient if it alleges, in ordinary and concise terms, that the 
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forth the probative facts by which that ultimate fact is to be 
established. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 260, 668 P.2d 130, 
136 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Hammit v. Virginia Mining "Co., 32 
Idaho 245, 181 P. 336 (1919)). Although a quiet title action 
challenges the title of an adversary, the plaintiff necessarily 
asserts his own estate in bringing a quiet title action. 
Id.(citing Dickerson v. Brewster, 88 Idaho 330, 399 P.2d 407 
(1965)). Thus, in an action to quiet title the plaintiff must 
establish the validity of his or her own title. It is not 
sufficient merely to expose a potential weakness of someone 
else's title to the same property. Bell v. Golden Condor, Inc., 
117 Idaho 21, 23, 784 P.2d 351, 353 (Ct. App. 1989)(citing Currie 
v. Walkinshaw, 113 Idaho 586, 746 P.2d 1045 (Ct. App. 1987)); see 
also Aldapef 105 Idaho at 260, 668 P.2d at 136 (citing Pincock v. 
Pocatello Gold & Copper Mining Co.r 100 Idaho 325, 597 P. 2d 211 
(1979)) . 
There is no evidence here that these Plaintiffs are the 
owners of the Petersen Farm. The Plaintiffs allege (in the 
Second Amended Complaint, without verification) that they are 
"the owners in fee simple of the property described in Exhibit 
1." However, that allegation was denied by the Defendants in 
their Answer and Counterclaim. Joan Williams prepared a title 
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commitment for property owned by Reed L. Petersen, Norman L. 
Petersen, Percy E. Petersen, and LaVern H. Petersen (allegedly 
this same property) at the request of Curt Petersen. This Court 
cannot allow these plaintiffs to quiet title in this property to 
themselves, when there is no evidence that they own the property-
Ill. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - COUNTERCLAIM 
A. 
The Defendant, Stanley Nielsen, also moves for summary 
judgment as to. his breach of contract claim against the 
Plaintiffs. The Court instead grants summary judgment to the 
Plaintiffs, because there is no option agreement to breach. 
Generally, a lessee suing for damages for breach of an option to 
purchase leased land must establish that the lease containing the 
option was in full force and effect at the time he attempted to 
exercise the option. The lease and the option had been 
previously terminated in Case No. 7-874. 
In 1975, Reed and Ethel Petersen, Norman and Myme Petersen, 
LaVern Petersen and the estate of Georgia Petersen, and Percy and 
Inez Petersen (hereinafter Petersens) sold the Petersen Farm to 
Dale and Kathleen Tubbs (hereinafter Tubbs) pursuant to a 
contract of sale. In 1983, Elwood and Lynn Nielsen (hereinafter 
Nielsens) were assigned the Tubbsf interest in the contract in 
order to continue to purchase the property from Petersens. In 
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February 1986, Nielsens filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Pursuant 
to an August 6, 1986 agreement between the Nielsens and the 
Petersens, the Petersen Farm was released from the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy- In that agreement, the parties agreed that: 
1. Petersens would receive ten years of payments from 
the Conservation Reserve Program (hereinafter CRP); 
2. Nielsens would lease the house, outbuildings, the 
land on which the house and outbuildings were located, 
and all other land (not in the CRP) for the same ten 
years; 
3. Petersens. would pay the taxes on the property (for 
years after 1986). Nielsens would maintain the 
buildings and fences and would insure the house; 
4. Nielsens would get the proceeds of the 1986 crop, 
pay the 1986 and prior years1 property taxes; 
5. Nielsens would plant the CRP property into 
appropriate CRP crop (at the expense of the Petersens); 
6. Petersens would grant the Nielsens an option to 
purchase the property at the end of the ten years 
lease. Both parties agreed to sign and put the 
appropriate documents in escrow to effect this 
agreement. 
However, Nielsens never could put the Chapter 11 reorganization 
plan together. Therefore, they were forced into a Chapter 7 
liquidation plan. The Court (in Case No. 7-874 in August, 1991) 
therefore found that the August 6, 198 6 Agreement was void, 
because Nielsens could not proceed in the Chapter 11 plan as 
contemplated in the agreement. He then returned the parties to 
their pre-agreement position, as if (1) an agreement had never 
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been formulated and (2) the Petersen Farm had never been a part 
of the bankruptcy. This Court finds that August, 1991 Order 
terminated not only the lease, but also the option Mr. Nielsen 
now seeks to enforce. 
Mr. Nielsen first argues that the Court never discussed the 
option in its August 26, 1991 Memorandum Decision and Order, 
therefore it only intended to eliminate the lease and leave the 
option viable. The Court disagrees. There is no evidence in 
this record that the Court intended for Nielsens to have any 
further interest in this property (including the right to 
purchase it pursuant to the language of the option). Both 
parties were allowed^to amend their pleadings after the August, 
1991 decision. Petersens were allowed to amend to assert a 
breach of contract action (for failure to pay pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of the land sale contract). Nielsens 
amended their complaint and counterclaim to assert (1) that the 
Court erred in terminating the lease and the option in the 
agreement, and (2) the Court should allow them redemption rights. 
The Court granted summary judgment to the Petersens on September 
1, 1992, however forcing them to foreclose on the property in 
judicial foreclosure (which allowed Nielsens credit for the CRP 
payments and redemption rights). After invalid attempts at 
bankruptcy by Nielsens in other states, the Court entered a 
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Nielsens attempted to stay the sale of the property while they 
could appeal his decision. The Court denied the request. When 
the Nielsens filed a Notice of Interest in Real Property in 
Oneida County on July 22, 1993, the Court found such recordation 
to be "a contemptible action" in its November 9, 1994 Order Re: 
Contempt and awarded costs and fees to the Petersens for fighting 
such a filing. 
Further, it is the general rule that termination of a lease 
of property containing an option to purchase previous to the 
expiration of the term also terminates the option, if the lease 
is construable as entire and indivisible, and the option and 
other provisions of the lease are interdependent. Moore v. 
Northwest Fabricators, Inc., 51 Wash 2d 26, 28, 314 P.2d 941, 943 
(1957); Gershenhom v. Walter R. Stutz Enterprises, 72 Nevada 
293, 298, 304 P.2d 395, 400 (1956) reh den 72 Nevada 312, 306 
P.2d 121, cert den 354 U.S. 926, 1 L.Ed 2d 1437, 77 S.Ct. '1382 
reh den (Nev.) 306 P.2d 121; See also Krepcik v. Tippett, 109 
Idaho 696, 701, 710 P.2d 606, 711 (Ct. App. 1985). This lease 
was terminated prior to the expiration of the lease term. The 
option and the other provisions of the August 6, 1986 Agreement 
are interdependent. The lease and the option are indivisible. 
The CRP payments are payments for the lease and for the option. 
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There is no evidence that Nielsens paid any different 
consideration for the leased property in the agreement than for 
the option. This lease/option agreement was a package to rectify 
a problem which existed at the time of its making. There is no 
evidence that it was ever intended to be divisible. Therefore, 
this Court finds that the termination of the lease agreement also 
terminated the option (whether or not expressed by the Court in 
its August 16, 1991 decision). 
Mr. Nielsen next argues that the Court was wrong in its 
August 26, 1991 decision in Case No. 7-874. Whether the Court 
was wrong or right, an appeal is the proper challenge to that 
action not a counterclaim in a separate proceeding. Failure to 
appeal fixes the rights of the parties so far as they are 
determined by such judgment. Briggs v. Mason, 44 Idaho 283, 285, 
256 P. 368, 370 (1927). Nielsens did appeal the Court's decision 
three different times; all of which appeals were denied. The 
doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of 
issues actually litigated and decided in a prior case. Anderson 
v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171, 178 
(1986) . The appropriate test for when collateral estoppel should 
apply includes the following: 
(1) Did the party "against whom the earlier decision is 
asserted ... have a 'full and fair opportunity to 
litigate that issue in the earlier case?'" (2) Was the 
issue decided in the prior litigation "identical with 
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the one presented in the action in question?" (3) Was 
the issue actually decided in the prior litigation? 
This may be dependent on whether deciding -the issue was 
"necessary to [the prior] judgment." (4) "Was there a 
final judgment on the merits?" (5) "Was the party 
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication?" 
Anderson, 112 Idaho at 183-84, 731 P.2d at 178-79 (citations 
omitted). 
In Case No. 7-784, the Nielsens had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue of the intent of their August 
6, 198 6 Agreement and the resulting consequences to the agreement 
of failing to reorganize in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (as 
contemplated by the parties when making the agreement) . They 
were represented by L. Charles Johnson III and fought the 
Petersens regarding the intent of the August 6, 1986 agreement 
throughout the proceedings prior to the August 26, 1991 decision. 
The resulting consequences to the agreement of failing to 
reorganize under Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the exact same issue 
here presented. Though the Court, in Case No. 7-874, never 
actually said that option was terminated, the fact that the 
agreement was terminated was decided in that case. With the 
lease agreement terminated, then the option was terminated 
because the lease and the option were interdependent in the 
agreement. There was a final judgment on the. merits. Mr. 
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Stanley Nielsen is in privity with the Nielsens, the defendants 
in the prior adjudication. Relitigation of the issue regarding 
the effects of failing to reorganize may therefore not be 
accomplished by filing a counterclaim here. 
Mr. Nielsen then attempts to fortify his arguments about a 
faulty Court judgment, in Case No. 7-874, by arguing that (1) the 
Court wrongly allowed the Petersens to foreclose on the property 
as a mortgage while the agreement between the Nielsens and the 
Petersens was a land sales contract and (2) the Nielsens were 
never given any consideration for the CRP payments collected by 
Petersens after the foreclosure. Again, these issues are 
eliminated by the doctrine of res judicata. They were issues in 
Case No. 7-874 and need not be reconsidered here. Further, 
courts have long found that a judicial foreclosure sale of real 
property (even in situations with land sale installment 
contracts) is "always an available remedy to a trial court and 
may well be the most equitable remedy." Rickel v. Energy Systems 
Holdings, Ltd., 114 Idaho 585, 587, 759 P.2d 876, 878 (1988). The 
Court allocated the CRP payments made prior to the foreclosure to 
the benefit of the Nielsens in determining the amount owed by 
Nielsens to Petersens on the property; then the property was 
given to a receiver to sell the property at a sheriff's sale. 
The Nielsens also received the benefit from the future CRP 
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payments, as (1) if the buyer at the sheriff's sale paid more 
than was owed against the property, such excess would have been 
returned to the Nielsens, and (2) the future guaranteed CRP 
payments increased the likelihood that more would be bid at the 
sheriff's sale by a potential buyer. The doctrine of res 
judicata prevents the relitigation of matters which have 
proceeded to a final conclusion between the parties to the 
litigation or their privies. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 
458, 680 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1984); Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697, 
638 P.2d 894 (1981); Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 
Idaho 724, 552 P.2d.776 (1976); Gaige v. City of Boiser 91 Idaho 
481, 425 P'.2d 52 (1967) . 
Mr. Nielsen next collaterally attacks the judgment in Case 
No. 7-874, arguing that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue 
that judgment. The issue (decided by the Court in Case No. 7-87 4 
on August 26, 1991) was the effect of the failure to reorganize 
under Chapter 11 bankruptcy on the August 6, 198 6 Agreement. The 
issue was decided by determining the intent of the parties in 
making that agreement. There is no authority for the position 
that an Idaho district court had no authority to make that 
decision. Further, the property had been abandoned from the 
bankruptcy estate and the Petersens had been given relief from 
the automatic stay in bankruptcy to "pursue all of their legal 
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and contractual remedies" against such property. Only in Case 
No. 7-974 was there a venue to pursue such remedies. A court's 
final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to 
collateral attack if they have jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the action. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granada, 99 Idaho 
624, 626, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978). 
Mr. Nielsen also argues that a jury ought to interpret the 
August 26, 1991 decision in Case No. 7-874 and determine whether 
the Court eliminated the option with the lease. The Court finds 
absolutely no authority for that position. It has always been a 
courtfs duty to construe a judgment so as to give it effect and 
validity, making its interpretation in harmony with the facts and 
the law of the case. Evans v. City of American Falls, 52 Idaho 
7, 20, 11 P.2d 363, 376 (1932); Follett v. Taylor Brothers, 77 
Idaho 416, 425, 294 P.2d 1088, 1097 (1956). When hearing an 
action to enforce a judgment and finding the judgment ambiguous, 
a court may even refer to the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the judgment in attempting to interpret it. Lester v. 
Lester, 104 Idaho 244, 245, 658 P.2d 915, 916 (1983) (citations 
omitted). 
B. 
Mr. Nielsen finally argues that the Plaintiffs (in order to 
allege jurisdiction over Mr. Nielsen) took the legal position 
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that the option was accepted and became a contract before the 
option ceased to be effective. Therefore Nielsens argue that the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel should prevent the Plaintiffs from 
talcing a contrary position regarding the validity of the option. 
Reading the Plaintiffs' briefs, the Court does not find that to 
be the Plaintiffs' legal position at all. 
In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 
(1997), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted of the language of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (in Rissetto v. Plumbers and 
Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.1996)) in 
stating the doctrine of judicial estoppel. It said: 
Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine 
of preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a 
party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, 
and then seeking a second advantage by taking an 
incompatible position ... 
In Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 101, 952 P. 2d 
914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998), the Idaho Court of Appeal explained, 
"this doctrine prevents a party from assuming a position in one 
proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a 
subsequent proceeding." That did not happen here. The 
Plaintiffs have argued that Mr. Nielsen's position regarding the 
option and breach of contract could not be plead, without also 
making him subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. They have 
however never agreed that the option was valid at the time it was 
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allegedly exercised. The Court does not see those as 
inconsistent positions. 
The fact that counsel for Mr. Nielsen read the Plaintiffs1 
argument in their briefs and then agreed to personal jurisdiction 
over Mr. Nielsen herein (thereafter filing a counterclaim) did 
not commit this Court to the same decision. However when Mr. 
Nielsen filed a counterclaim, which was thereafter answered by 
the Plaintiffs, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this 
Court. Cage v. Harris, 119 Idaho 451, 807 P.2d 1289 (Ct. App. 
1991) . 
IV. OTHER MOTIONS 
The Nielsens have moved to strike Paragraphs 3 and 4 from 
the Affidavit of Joan Williams. The Court did not rely on either 
paragraph 3 or 4 of such affidavit in making this decision. 
Therefore, the Court finds a decision as to that motion to be 
moot and does not grant the motion. 
Also before the Court was the Memorandum of Costs as to Lynn 
Nielsen's judgment. Since the Court has determined the other 
remaining issues (in this action) in this Memorandum Decision and 
Order, the Court will rule on costs and attorney fees as to all 
parties and all claims at one time. The Court will await further 
Memorandums of Costs and/or Objections to the same prior to 
issuing a decision as to any costs and fees. The Court will 
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therefore take the decision as to the awarding of the costs and 
fees regarding Lynn Nielsenfs judgment under advisement at that 
same time. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED April 22, 1999. 
Copies to: 
F. Randall Kline 
Daniel L. Hawkley 
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EXHIBIT "H" 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER, MAY 24,1999 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
Case No. CV-97-566 
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah Partnership, 
ETHEL PETERSEN, general 
partner, CURTIS PETERSEN, 
ROBERT PETERSEN, DIXIE 
JACKSON, Limitad Partners; 
NORMAN L. PETERSEN (deceased) 
and MAYME PETERSEN, and their 
successors in interest 
BETTY RUSSELL and LOUISE 
HARBINSON, LAVERN H. 
PETERSEN and PERCY E. 
PETERSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and F. 
STANLEY NIELSEN, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
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This matter again comes before the Court on May 24, 19S9 for 
determination of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Defendant, 
F. Stanley Nielsen, the Motion Requesting the Honorable N. Randy 
Smith to Consider Recusal filed by both Defendants, the Motion for 
Court to Take Judicial Notice filed by Defendant, F. Stanley 
Nielsen, and the Memorandums of Costs filed by both Defendants and 
the Plaintiffs. Appearing for the Plaintiffs at the hearing was F. 
Randall Kline. Appearing for the Defendants was Daniel L. Hawkley. 
Prior to the hearing, the Court received and reviewed the 
motions and memorandums of costs, the Memorandum in Support of 
Nielsen's Motion for Reconsideration, the Objection to the 
Memorandum of Costs" for Elwood Nielsen, the Objection to the 
Memorandum of Costs for F. Stanley Nielsen, the Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs, and the two Responses to the 
Objections to Costs for the Defendants. 
At the hearing, the Court heard the respective arguments of 
counsel and RULED as follows: 
1. The Court DENIES the Motion Requesting the Honorable N. 
Randy Smith to Consider Recusal; 
The Court explained its decision as to the Motion Requesting 
Recusal on the record. Such motion must be brought pursuant to 
Rule 40(d) (2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the 
grounds enumerated in the rule apply here. It was not a motion to 
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disqualify, rather a motion to consider recusal. No affidavit of 
the party or the party's attorney was filed with the motion. 
When this judge took over this case in February, 1998, he 
reviewed the prior filings herein, the Complaint for Slander of 
Title, the Motion to Dismiss F. Stanley Nielsen, the Motion to 
Disqualify Honorable Don Harding, the Amended Motion of F. Stanley 
Nielsen to Set Aside Default and Motion to Set Aside Decree 
Foreclosing Mortgage and Ordering Sale in Oneida County Case No, 7-
874, the Motion for Protective Order, the Motion to Disqualify F. 
Randall Kline as Attorney, the Plaintiffs' Response to the Amended 
Motion and Motion to Set Aside, the Amended Moticn to Dismiss 
Complaint, and the January 12, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Since F. Stanley Nielsen's own Amended Motion to Set Aside Default 
and Motion to Set Aside Decree Foreclosing Mortgage and Ordering 
Sale in Oneida County Case No. 7-874 (1) reference that Judge 
Harding had taken judicial notice of the entire Oneida Case No. 7-
874 file and (2) cannot be adjudicated without reviewing the file, 
the Court asked for the file and reviewed it to find the decree 
foreclosing mortgage and ordering sale and those orders included 
therein. However, the Court's decisions in this case are made on 
the facts as outlined in its decisions and none ether. Idaho Code 
section 9-101 further outlines these facts which a court may 
judicially notice. 
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The Court's reasoning in its prior decisions is in the record. 
The fact that the Defendants do not like such reasoning does not 
make the Court biased or prejudiced against them. They m fact 
prevailed on the Second Amended Complaint. 
The Court did not refuse to let this case end prior to being 
asked to rule on the summary judgment motion on the breach of 
contract counterclaim. Mr. Hawkley made that decision. He 
voluntarily submitted his client to the jurisdiction of this Court 
and filed the counterclaim, which was answered by the Plaintiffs, 
2. The Court GRANTS the Motion for Court to Take Judicial 
Notice; 
3. As to the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court gave the 
Defendants until June 4, 1999 to file a response to the Plaintiffs' 
Objection to F. Stanley Nielsen's Motion for Reconsideration (which 
neither the Court nor the Defendants had received at the time of 
the hearing) . The Court will then take that motion under 
advisement; 
4. As to the Memorandums of Costs for these Defendants and 
the Plaintiffs, the Court (1) gave the Plaintiffs until June 4, 
1999 to file an affidavit with the Court detailing the costs of 
defending against the counterclaim of F. Stanley Nielsen since its 
filing and (2) gave the Defendants until Jvine 4, 1999 to file an 
affidavit with the Court detailing the costs of defending against 
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the Second Amended Complaint for Slander of Title, Quiet Title and 
Declaration of Rights. The Court will then take the Memorandums of 
Costs under advisement. 
Though not an issue at the hearing, the Court had previously 
taken the Memorandum of Costs (dated March 1, 1999) relating to a 
previously dismissed Defendant, Lynn Nielsen, under advisement. 
The Court had hoped to decide that issue at the same time as these 
present Memorandums of Costs-(See Paragraph IV Other Motions in the 
Court's previous Memorandum Decision and Order). However, since 
the Court gave the parties until June 4 to submit further 
information as the these present Memorandums of Costs, the Court 
now decides the Memorandum of Costs of Lynn Nielsen. The Court 
DENIES such costs. 
Such Memorandum of Costs only requested attorney fees. Ms. 
Nielsen alleges that the complaint(s) against her had been 
"brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court does not find that circumstance here. Instead, the Court 
finds that the Plaintiffs pursued this matter reasonably until the 
Court issued the summary judgment dismissing her from the case. 
Much of the information, necessary to prove the elements of slander 
of title against Ms. Nielsen, was totally within her control. Ms. 
Nielsen's actions regarding this property, prior to filing this 
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action, may reasonably have given the Plaintiffs cause to believe 
that she would slander title to this property. However, no 
evidence was ever found that Ms. Nielsen had done any action to 
slander such title. 
Further as to special damages, this Court has interpreted Ray 
v. Shull Enterprises Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 530, 700 P.2d 567, 573 
(1985), in a manner different than the interpretation of the 
Plaintiffs. However, the Court does net find the Plaintiffs were 
unreasonable in their interpretation of the definition of special 
damages. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED May 24, 1999. 
tflDY SMITH 
District Judge 
Copies to: 
F. Randall Kline 
Daniel L. Hawkley 
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EXHIBIT "I" 
FINAL JUDGMENT OF JULY 16, 1999 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEJDA 
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah Partnership, 
ETHEL PETERSEN, general partner; 
CURTIS PETERSEN, ROBERT 
PETERSEN. DDCIE JACKSON, Limited 
Partners: NORMAN L. PETERSEN 
(deceased) and MAYME PETERSEN 
and their successors in interest. BETTY 
RUSSELL and LOUISE HARBINSON. 
LAVERN H. PETERSEN and PERCY 
E. PETERSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN, and 
F. STANLEY NIELSEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-97-566 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW having been entered by the 
Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order dated April 22, 1999, 
JT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 
1. Summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' quiet title action be entered; 
2. Judgment on the pleadings dismissing plaintiffs' slander of title claim, the declaratory 
judgment claims, the prayer for an order to strike, etc., and the injunctive relief be entered; and 
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the injunctive relief be entered; and 
3. Summary judgment dismissing the Counterclaim be entered. 
DATED TmSy^PSay <^!fta999. 
District Judge 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER RE: COSTS AND FEES 
SEPTEMBER 11, 1999 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
Register No. CV97-566 
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah Partnership 
ETHEL PETERSEN, general 
partner; CURTIS PETERSEN, 
ROBERT PETERSEN, DIXIE 
JACKSON, Limited Partners, 
NORMAN L. PETERSEN (deceased) 
and MAYME PETERSEN and their 
successors in interest 
BETTY RUSSELL and LOUISE 
HARBINSON, LAVERN H. 
PETERSEN and PERCY E. PETERSEN 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN, and 
F. STANLEY NIELSEN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER 
RE: COSTS AND FEES 
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On September 7, 1999, the Court heard the arguments of counsel 
concerning costs and fees in this matter. The Court then took the 
issue under advisement. The Court now decides the issue. 
A. 
The Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Slander of Title on 
February 21, 1997, for which they sought damages and an 
injunction. They also sought "a determination that the Agreement 
of Option to Purchase Real Property is of no force and effect." 
The Plaintiffs then amended their complaint, again filing an 
"Amended Complaint for Slander of Title," with a similar prayer 
for relief. Upon receiving this Oneida County case, this Court 
was then asked to determine what parts of it (if any) should be 
dismissed. In the May 18, 1999 hearing, the Court attempted to 
determine that question. At that time, counsel for the 
Plaintiffs represented to the Court that this was not a quiet 
title action, but instead only an action for slander of title 
(even though the Court pointed out that Mr. Stanley Nielsen was 
not a party to the previous "quiet title action" between other 
parties and/or their predecessors to this action). The Court 
therefore finds that (1) the Plaintiffs1 action was for slander 
of title (until the February 26, 1999 Second Amended Complaint), 
(2) such an action would be a tort action, and (3) attorney fees 
are awarded in such action in the discretion of the Court. 
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There has also been a continuing issue concerning the 
Court's jurisdiction over Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen in this matter. 
While the Court (in Judge Harding's January 12, 1998 Memorandum 
Decision and Order) found that it had personal jurisdiction over 
Mr. Nielsen, it has been consistently disputed. Only after the 
Plaintiffs filed their February 26, 1999 Second Amended Complaint 
(in which they alleged a quiet title action, a declaratory 
judgment action, and a slander of title action) did Mr. Nielsen 
agree to submit himself to this Court's jurisdiction. 
This Court never made a final decision (after the filing of 
the Amended Complaint for Slander of Title) as to its 
jurisdiction over Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen. However, it has 
advised counsel in several hearings that a determination of the 
validity of the assignment of the option (having no quiet title 
action alleged against the Defendants) would not seem to be an 
"action in rem," but rather one in which the Court would need "in 
personam" jurisdiction. Therefore until Mr. Nielsen's own 
submission to its jurisdiction in March, 1999 when filing the 
counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court questioned whether 
it could determine the validity of the assignment of the option 
in an alleged slander of title action. 
As to the slander of title claim against these Defendants, 
the Court finds that the Defendants are both prevailing parties. 
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The Defendants have claimed no costs as a matter of right in 
their Memorandums of Cost. The Court also finds that neither 
Defendant is entitled to discretionary costs. The only 
discretionary costs claimed by either Defendant were costs for 
the mileage of counsel, claimed by Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen. While 
the Court finds that these costs were "necessary" and "reasonably 
incurred," the Court does not find them to be "exceptional costs" 
in defending in this matter. 
As to attorney fees, the Court finds that (in order to be 
awarded fees in the defense of a slander of title action) the 
Plaintiffs must have brought or pursued the case "frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because much of the information 
regarding the elements of the slander of title action (uttering 
or publishing the statements, false statements, and malice) was 
in the total control of the Defendants, the Court does not find 
that the Plaintiffs brought or pursued this case in such manner 
until the Court issued its December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision 
and Order. The Court further believes that Mr. Elwood Nielsen's 
actions, prior to filing the slander of title action against him, 
may reasonably have given the Plaintiffs cause to believe that he 
would have slandered title to this property. 
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However, in the Courtfs December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision 
and Order, the Court found no slander of title action against Mr. 
Stanley Nielsen. Then the Plaintiffs again filed a slander of 
title action against him in their Second Amended Complaint. That 
allegation, the Court believes was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation. 
As to the allegations for quiet title and declaratory 
judgment in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds Mr. 
Hawkley allowed those claims to be brought against Mr. Nielsen in 
this Court. Given Mr. Nielsen's response to them by filing his 
own breach of contract counterclaim, the Court cannot find that 
they were brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and 
without foundation in this Court. At some time, those claims 
would have needed to have been resolved. Mr. Nielsen chose to 
resolve them here. 
Reviewing the costs as detailed in Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen's 
Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, the Court therefore 
awards him all of the costs incurred from January 5, 1999 until 
February 8, 1999 and one half of the costs incurred from March 
23, 1999 (after the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended 
Complaint on February 26, 1999) through June 18, 1999 
(determining that one half of such costs were incurred in 
defending the slander of title action and the other half in 
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defending the quiet title action). That amount totals $3,536.25. 
The request for such attorney fees meets the requirements of Rule 
54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, given 
consideration of all of the factors outlined therein. The Court 
emphasizes the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions, the prevailing charges for like 
work, the amount involved and the results obtained in making that 
determination. 
As to Mr. Elwood Nielsen, the Court cannot find that the 
Plaintiffs brought and/or pursued this matter frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation. The Court had some concern 
about the pursuit of slander of title action after the February 
8, 1999 hearing. There, the Court informed the Plaintiffs that 
they must allege damages which were different than the attorney 
fees they were incurring in pursuing the slander of title action. 
However, given Judge Harding's contrary prior rulings in this 
matter, the Court finds it difficult to find that the Plaintiffs 
brought or pursued the matter frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation. 
B. 
Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen brought an Amended Counterclaim for 
breach of contract on November 21, 1998. Such Amended 
Counterclaim was withdrawn by Mr. Nielsen without the Plaintiffs 
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ever filing an answer to it. A counterclaim for breach of 
contract was again filed in March, 1999. On that counterclaim 
the Court granted summary judgment in its April 22, 1999 
Memorandum Decision and Order. The Court therefore finds that 
the Plaintiffs prevailed on that counterclaim. 
The Plaintiffs claim no costs as a matter of right as to the 
counterclaim. The Court does not find that postage and copies 
costs (incurred after March 22, 1999) are discretionary costs, 
which should be awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d) (1) (D). While they 
may be necessary and reasonably incurred, they are not 
exceptional costs incurred in the defense of this counterclaim. 
As to an award of attorney fees on the counterclaim, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiffs may only claim such fees based on 
Idaho Code section 12-120(3), a civil action for recovery in any 
commercial transaction. 
Reviewing the costs as detailed in the Memorandum of Costs 
for the Petersens, the Court, in its discretion, awards the 
Plaintiffs $1,345.50. That amount is determined by dividing in 
two, those costs (which appear related to this defense) incurred 
after the filing of the amended complaint for breach of contract 
in March, 1999, beginning with the costs incurred on March 22, 
1999. The costs incurred on March 30, 1999 do not appear to be 
related to the defense of the counterclaim. The Court divided 
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the costs in two, because the Plaintiffs were also pursuing their 
own claims in incurring the costs outlined in that Memorandum. 
The Court also finds that these costs meet the requirements 
of Rule 54(e)(3). They are appropriate when considering all of 
the factors there outlined, especially the time and labor 
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions considered, 
the prevailing charges for like work, and the amount involved and 
the results obtained. 
C. 
While there have been other counterclaims brought herein, 
they have been withdrawn by the Defendants prior to a decision by 
the Court. The Court therefore finds that there were no 
prevailing parties as to those counterclaims. 
The Defendants have also requested attorney fees under Idaho 
Code section 12-123. However, the Court believes that its award 
of attorney fees (as explained in paragraph A) is the most that 
should be awarded under Idaho Code section 12-123 for frivolous 
conduct. The Court, in its discretion, therefore declines any 
further award. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Register No CV-97-566 
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER RE: COSTS AND FEES 
Page 8 
DATED September 11, 1999, 
./RANDY 6MITH 
District Judge 
Copies to: 
F. Randall Kline 
Daniel L. Hawkley 
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RULING OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
JANUARY 31,2000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF.. WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
F. STANLEY NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED L. PETERSEN, et al. , 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 
J * * * * * 
990900364 
Defendant Curtis Petersen moves the court to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or in 
the alternative, for a more definitive statement and for sanctions. 
Plaintiff moves the court for partial summary judgment. 
Preliminarily, the court understands, from plaintiff's letter 
"courtesy-copied" to this court, that plaintiff believes that 
defendant's motion is essentially moot because of the subsequent 
filing on October 15, 1999, of an amended complaint. Such an 
argument is not properly before the court to prevent the court from 
ruling on the motion to dismiss. More importantly, however, 
plaintiff has not received leave of court to file an amended 
complaint. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course. 
Rule 15, U.R.C.P. Plaintiff filed the original complaint on January 
19, 1999, and filed an amended complaint on February 26, 199 9. 
Accordingly, plaintiff may not amend his^complaint without leave of 
court, which he has not sought. 
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Facts 
The underlying dispute revolves around a lease of and option 
to purchase real property located in Oneida County, Idaho (the 
"Petersen farm"). Plaintiff's first cause of action stems from an 
alleged breach of the option to purchase the Petersen farm. The 
second cause of action is a claim for malicious prosecution from a 
prior suit by defendant against plaintiff for slander of title of 
the Petersen farm. The court addresses each cause of action 
individually. 
Breach of Contract 
Plaintiff contends that defendant breached the option to 
purchase by not recognizing his attempt to exercise the option. 
Both parties have submitted matters outside the pleadings and the 
court treats the motion as one for summary judgment. Rule 12, 
U.R.C.P. Defendant argues (1) that defendant: was not party to the 
option, and, thus, is not bound by it; (2) that this court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction because the property is located in the 
state of Idaho; and (3) that this matter has previously been 
litigated and is barred by the doctrine of ices judicata. 
Although relatives of defendant signed the option to purchase, 
defendant was never a party to the contract. Plaintiff contends, 
however, that defendant was in privity with the original grantors 
of the option. To support such, plaintiff files his own affidavit. 
The affidavit fails to provide any admissible evidence that 
defendant was in privity of contract with the original parties to 
the contract. The affidavit simply states that plaintiff sent a 
letter to defendant Curtis Petersen, "the personal representative 
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of a deceased grantor of an option." Even viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the plaintiff), as 
required by law, plaintiff still fails to provide any evidence of 
defendant's privity of contract. Plaintiff also fails to provide 
any writing indicating the alleged privity, or any evidence or 
argument setting out any other valid basis on which defendant is 
liable, either in law or equity. 
Next, simply because the real property is located in Idaho, 
this court does not loose, automatically, subject matter 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981). 
Notwithstanding, because of the court's other rulings are 
dispositive of the case, the court does not need to rule on this 
issue. 
Additionally, defendant contends that the claim has already 
been litigated and is therefore barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. Plaintiff's predecessor in interest was sued by the 
Petersen family in Oneida County to quiet title over the Petersen 
farm. The Idaho court found that the subject lease was void. 
Defendant was not a party to the Idaho suit and res judicata would 
not apply directly to him. If defendant were a successor in 
interest to the lease and option (the court already ruled above 
that plaintiff has failed to present any admissible evidence of 
such), he would also be a successor in interest from his family's 
prior suit over the lease and option with plaintiff. Accordingly, 
res judicata, if satisfied, would likewise bar plaintiff's instant 
suit against defendant. 
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Plaintiff argues that the ruling from the Idaho court simply 
found that the "lease" was void, and that: the court failed to 
address the "option." The Idaho court issued a "Decree Foreclosing 
Mortgage and Ordering Sale" on April 16, 1993. The Idaho court 
later found plaintiff in contempt for filing a "Notice of Interest 
in Real Property" in the Petersen farm after it ordered the 
foreclosing and the sale of the Petersen farm. The Idaho court 
found that the notice was in contravention of its prior order 
"relative to the affect and operation of the Lease and Option to 
Purchase"(emphasis added) and held the notice of interest to be 
void. 
Furthermore, the Idaho court issued an "Order Quieting Title" 
on June 14, 1996, holding that ff[t]he Petersens have full right, 
title, and interest in [the Petersen Farm]. Plaintiff appealed the 
Idaho court's rulings. The appeal was dismissed, however, on 
November 7, 1996. 
Subsequent to the first Idaho suit, the parties were involved 
in a second Idaho suit (the "second Idaho court"). In that suit, 
Curtis Petersen (along with others) sued the current plaintiff for 
slander of title. Plaintiff counterclaimed, seeking relief based on 
the lease and option. The second Idaho court ruled that the prior 
Idaho ruling found that the lease and option were both void. The 
second Idaho court clearly addressed the validity of the option. 
Plaintiff counters, however, that the second Idaho court did not 
have jurisdiction to make such a rulingu and that such a ruling on 
the option would not be a full and fair ruling on the merits, as 
required by the doctrine of res judicata. 
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The rulings of the two Idaho courts are clear and undisputed. 
Both courts held the lease and option to purchase to be void. It is 
not the place of this court to review the rulings of foreign courts 
that clearly had jurisdiction, clearly considered the issues and 
were subject to appeal in that state. The court finds that the 
doctrine of res judicata applies and bars the cause of breach of 
contract against defendant. See, e.g., Estate of Covington v. 
Josephson, 888 P. 2d 675 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) (detailing the elements 
of res judicata) . 
Malicious Prosecution 
Plaintiff claims that defendant committed the tort of 
malicious prosecution by suing plaintiff in a slander of title suit 
in the second Idaho suit. Both sides of the suit were dismissed 
through summary judgment. Additionally, the Idaho court imposed a 
sanction on defendant for his actions. The issue of any impropriety 
with the slander suit have already been dealt with by a foreign 
court and plaintiff fails to propose any valid justification why 
the doctrine of res judicata would not also bar this claim. 
Conclusion 
Plaintiff clearly wants to exercise the option. He has, 
however, already had his day in court. This court will not allow 
defendant to "forum shop" in an attempt to overturn foreign courts' 
unpleasant ruling. Plaintiff's ability and choices with respect to 
appealing prior decisions rest solely with plaintiff. Defendant's 
motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's claims are accordingly 
dismissed. Defendant's motion, in the alternative, for a more 
definite statement is moot; and the motion for sanctions is denied. 
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Plaintiff and defendant have filed many other motions and 
pleadings with the court, many of which contravene established 
rules of procedure. Given the court's holding above, the court 
considers the other motions moot. 
Mr. Knowltoti will please prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this 3V day of January, 2000. 
Parley Rv Baldwin, Judge 
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